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On Nov. 10, an unexpected increase in demand for foreign currency sparked an unprecedented
three-day run on US dollars, which threw Argentina's financial markets into a tailspin. The Central
Bank was forced to sell more than US$300 million in foreign reserves to boost the peso and stave off
devaluation, thereby restoring financial stability, at least temporarily. The government blamed the
sudden surge in foreign exchange purchases directly on speculators, who hoped to push authorities
to devalue the peso, on a parity with the US dollar since last year. In April 1991, President Carlos
Menem approved a bold economic stabilization plan drafted by Economy Minister Domingo
Cavallo. The centerpiece of the plan was a currency convertibility scheme that required the Central
Bank to peg Argentine currency (then the austral) to the dollar. The plan, which authorized the use
of US dollars in any transaction in Argentina, obligates the Central Bank to maintain in reserve
US$1 or the equivalent in gold for every peso in circulation. Through open market transactions,
the Central Bank must maintain the peso within a very limited range of the dollar, and by law it is
forbidden to print money to cover any government deficits. As a result, inflation dropped almost
immediately, with the annual rate plummeting from 800% in 1990 to 56% in 1991, and to less than
20% this year. Nevertheless, domestic consumer price inflation is still considerably higher than
international US dollar-based inflation rates, leading many business executives to argue that the
peso is overvalued and that exports are uncompetitive. Consequently, the government blamed the
Nov. 10-13 run on US dollars on speculation by some of the country's largest corporations, which
are said to want a peso devaluation up to 60% In fact, Menem directly accused influential investor
Agostino Rocca of the Italian-Argentine Techint consortium of deliberately triggering the crisis.
On Nov. 10, Rocca openly appealed for periodic devaluations, setting off a wave of rumors that
devaluation was imminent. As a result, domestic and foreign banks began a mad scramble to buy up
dollars. By Nov. 11, the exchange rate jumped to 1.05 pesos per US$1, the first such currency decline
since the Cavallo plan took effect last year. By Nov. 14, fear spread that the rate would suddenly
plummet to 1.60 pesos per US$1. At the same time, prices on Argentina's foreign debt securities
fell almost 10% in international markets, and short-term rates on peso loans nearly quadrupled
to more than 50% as financial authorities attempted to soak up excess liquidity to slow the run on
US dollars. Apparently, other political variables contributed to the crisis, particularly widespread
rumors Menem had decided to dismiss his economy minister. Cavallo himself fed the rumors on
Nov. 5, when he brazenly told reporters that in addition to his government salary of US$1,800 per
month, he receives US$8,200 monthly from an economic research group he founded in the city
of Cordoba, Fundacion Mediterranea. The institute is financed by 400 companies, many of which
participated in the state's privatization program. This led opposition legislators to demand Cavallo's
resignation and judicial proceedings against him for bribery. One judge investigating the case
issued a preliminary finding that no bribery or conflict of interest exists, since it is common for
senior officials to augment their income from outside sources. However, the rumors over Cavallo's
dismissal continued unabated. To calm the country's financial concerns, Menem publicly stressed
his support for Cavallo, and unequivocally warned speculators that the peso-dollar parity would be
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maintained. To shore up the peso, the Central Bank authorized the sale of US$300 million in foreign
reserves the first time the Central Bank has had to directly intervene on the market to maintain the
exchange rate since last year. As an additional step, the Central Bank closed its discount window
to banks that wanted to borrow pesos in order to buy dollars. Cavallo also stressed that the Central
Bank would make all its reserves available if necessary. Total foreign reserves are estimated at
US$11 billion, with about US$8.5 billion in immediately-available dollars. "We are not going to
abandon economic stability," Cavallo told the New York Times. "To devalue the peso, as many
speculators want us to do, is the surest way to return to hyperinflation and bring on a recession, and
the worst thing we could do politically." According to Cavallo, overvaluation of the peso is not the
cause of ongoing double-digit inflation because the economy is tied so strongly to the US dollar.
Rather, he said businesses are setting prices too high, while low productivity in local industries also
reduces their ability to compete. In place of devaluation, Cavallo advocates a reduction in taxes
and costly state regulations, as well changes in the country's outdated labor laws, which allegedly
increase production costs and discourage investments. Nevertheless, pressure to devalue the peso
will likely continue because strong union opposition and lack of support among legislators has
prevented the government from passing a new labor law and other bills to improve the investment
climate. In the absence of such incentives, many business executives will likely continue to favor
devaluation. (Sources: Agence France-Presse, 11/07/92, 11/10/92, 11/11/92, 11/12/92, 11/13/92,
11/14/92; Associated Press, 11/11/92; Spanish news service EFE, 11/13/92, 11/14/92; New York Times,
11/16/92)
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